


Commitment



Hiding: B does not learn m during commit phase.

Binding: A cannot change her mind (i.e., m in open phase = m in commit phase)

Correctness: If A & B honest, commit & open phase succeed & B gets m .

Com's occur in many crypto protos.

In Q setting, given a com, we can perform arb. secure function eval. (with inf-theo sec)

Classically: Impossible to conduct com that is inf-theo. hiding & binding.

Quantumly?

In early 90s, an inf-theo hiding & binding Q-com was proposed

→ But: broken

→ Later: General imposs.

Definitions (for case $m \in \{0,1\} \equiv$ bit commitments)

① Correctness: Com proto is ϵ_{corr} -correct iff:
 When A & B exec. ^{honestly} commit & open phase
 and A uses input m ,
 then $\Pr[B \text{ outputs } m] \geq 1 - \epsilon_{\text{corr}}$

② Hiding: Com proto is ϵ_{hid} -hiding iff:

Fix some algo B .

Let ρ_{AB}^m be the state of A & B
 after commit phase (A gets input m ,
 A honest)

Then: $\text{TD}(\text{tr}_A \rho_{AB}^0, \text{tr}_A \rho_{AB}^1) \leq \epsilon_{\text{hid}}$

③ Binding: Com proto is ϵ_{bind} -binding iff:

Fix A, A_0, A_1

$P_0 := \Pr[B \text{ outputs } 0 \text{ after running with } A \text{ in com \& } A_0 \text{ in open phase}]$


$P_1 := \Pr[B \text{ outputs } 1 \text{ after running with } A \text{ in com \& } A_1 \text{ in open phase}]$

Then $P_0 + P_1 \leq 1 + \epsilon_{\text{bind}}$.

Then: $\exists \epsilon > 0$ s.t.

\nexists com proto that is
 ϵ -corr, ϵ -binding, ϵ -hiding.

Then: For any 0-hiding, 0-correct com proto,
 we have that the proto is not
 ϵ -binding (for any $\epsilon < 1$)



Mathematical tool:

Schmidt decomposition

Thm: Fix a vector

$$|\psi\rangle \in \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$$

Then there are ONBs

$\{|\alpha_i\rangle\}$ of \mathcal{H}_A and $\{|\beta_i\rangle\}$ of \mathcal{H}_B

and some scalars $\lambda_i \geq 0$, and set I s.t.:

$$|\psi\rangle = \sum_{i \in I} \lambda_i |\alpha_i\rangle \otimes |\beta_i\rangle$$

Simultaneous Schmidt decomp:

$$\text{If } \text{tr}_A |\psi\rangle\langle\psi| = \text{tr}_A |\tilde{\psi}\rangle\langle\tilde{\psi}|,$$

then \exists Schmidt decomp of $|\psi\rangle, |\tilde{\psi}\rangle$

s.t. $|\beta_i\rangle = |\tilde{\beta}_i\rangle, \lambda_i = \tilde{\lambda}_i$ (but possibly $|\alpha_i\rangle \neq |\tilde{\alpha}_i\rangle$)

Impossibility proof

Assume some ^{com} protocol with A, B.

Assume protocol is \mathcal{O} -correct, \mathcal{O} -hiding.

Wlog: A & B are unitary \mathcal{O} -circuits

Let S_{AB}^m be state after commit phase with honest A & B.

$$\text{A \& B unitary} \Rightarrow S_{AB}^m = |\psi^m\rangle\langle\psi^m|$$

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{O}\text{-hiding} &\Rightarrow \text{tr}_A S_{AB}^0 = \text{tr}_A S_{AB}^1 \\ &\Rightarrow \text{tr}_A |\psi^0\rangle\langle\psi^0| = \text{tr}_A |\psi^1\rangle\langle\psi^1| \end{aligned}$$

Simult. Schmidt decomp:

$$|\psi^0\rangle = \sum \lambda_i |\alpha_i\rangle |\beta_i\rangle$$

$$|\psi^1\rangle = \sum \lambda_i |\tilde{\alpha}_i\rangle |\beta_i\rangle$$

$$\exists \text{ unitary } U: |\tilde{\alpha}_i\rangle = U|\alpha_i\rangle \forall i$$

Attack against binding

Com-phase A: Honest A with $m=0$

Open-phase A₀: Honest A

$$0\text{-correctness} \Rightarrow P_0 = \mathbb{P}[\text{B outputs } 0] = 1$$

Open-phase A₁:

State after com-phase: $|\psi^0\rangle = \sum_i \lambda_i |\alpha_i\rangle |\beta_i\rangle$

A₁ applies U to A's register

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow \text{state is: } & \sum_i \lambda_i U|\alpha_i\rangle |\beta_i\rangle \\ & = \sum_i \lambda_i |\tilde{\alpha}_i\rangle |\beta_i\rangle = |\psi^1\rangle \end{aligned}$$

A & B hold the state they would have had after honest com to $m=1$.

A runs honest A open phase

$$0\text{-correctness} \Rightarrow P_1 = \mathbb{P}[\text{B outputs } 1] = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow P_0 + P_1 = 2 \not\leq 1 + \epsilon_{\text{hid}} \text{ for any } \epsilon_{\text{hid}} < 1$$